Introduction
Shortly after 7 pm on Tuesday, 21st November 2011, a fire broke out on our intensive care unit (ICU). 1 An oxygen cylinder, laid on a patient' s bed in preparation for her transfer to another hospital, was turned on: a loud bang was heard, sparks were seen and the cylinder immediately caught fire, with four foot flames coming from the cylinder' s body ( Figure  1) . The bedding and mattress ignited, rapidly followed by the bed curtains, the flooring and ceiling tiles. The fire alarm was activated, and the patient on the burning bed was pulled to safety by two nurses and a doctor. Another nurse was trapped in a corner by the flames, and crawled under the burning bed to escape.
Within ten seconds the ICU was filled with thick, black, acrid smoke and visibility was reduced to less than a metre. Breathing became extremely difficult. The fire was put out by two doctors, using five fire extinguishers. Eleven of the 12 patients plus all visitors and staff were evacuated to a service road immediately outside the ICU within seven minutes. One patient had to be disconnected from a haemofiltration machine, and in many cases cannulae and nasogastric tubes were inadvertently pulled out. The ICU consultant rang two senior colleagues, asking them to cascade a call to all anaesthetic consultants requesting assistance, and rang ICUs in two neighbouring hospitals requesting preparation to receive transfers. The twelfth patient, ventilated in a side room and receiving haemofiltration, was not immediately affected and was evacuated 30 minutes later.
Patients were then transferred to the emergency department (ED) where a temporary ICU was set up, with each patient assigned a consultant anaesthetist. Two consultant anaesthetists had arrived before the fire and rescue services, and 15 others arrived within 30 minutes. After assessment, four patients were transferred to a neighbouring hospital' s ICU, and the remaining patients were transferred to a temporary ICU set up in the theatre recovery area.
The patient on the burning bed suffered burns to her lower legs and was transferred to the regional burns unit; no other patient or visitor suffered ill effects. All staff on the ICU were assessed by ED staff, and two members of staff were admitted for treatment of smoke inhalation injury.
The timeline for the incident is shown in Table 1 and was as follows: 19:20 -fire alarm manually activated; 10 seconds later -smoke detector alarms activated; 19:23 -fire and rescue services called by switchboard; 19:27 -eleven patients evacuated; 19:35 -fire and rescue services arrived on ICU.
Two other similar fires, both caused by oxygen cylinders, have occurred in the UK in the past two years. In a fire station in Suffolk, a fireman was checking an oxygen cylinder which Managing the aftermath of a fire on intensive care caused by an oxygen cylinder 2C07, 3C00 FE Kelly, R Hardy, TM Cook, JP Nolan, T Craft, M Osborn, C Bedor, J Hunt
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The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigation concluded that the fire started within the oxygen cylinder valve; the cylinder was almost completely destroyed and it is therefore unlikely that the exact cause will be discovered. This article focuses on the impact of the fire on the hospital and staff and lessons learnt.
Immediate aftermath
The medical director's perspective 19.30: I was asked to return to the hospital immediately by the on-call hospital manager. Before becoming Medical Director, I was an ICU consultant for 16 years, so the environment was familiar to me and the seriousness of the situation immediately apparent. 19.50: I was in the hospital, had been briefed and had established a central incident control room. I attended the unit to assure myself everyone was safe; I could smell burnt material even from the corridor outside ICU. The unit was transformed: it was empty of patients and nursing staff, and had equipment strewn about. The floor, walls and ceiling around a corner bed space had obviously been on fire (Figures 2 and 3) . Security staff were establishing a cordon to prevent others entering. The press were already aware of the fire, a reflection on the speed that information is spread through social media. 20.05: In the incident control room, I established that no-one had died, all patients had been evacuated, and that some staff were being treated in ED for smoke inhalation. All consultant anaesthetists had arrived to help, having been alerted by a restricted major incident call.
20.15:
We ensured a number of further actions:
• Inbound ambulances with seriously unwell patients were diverted to other hospitals. • All staff involved in the fire were removed from duty: some required persuasion, and in a minority, insistence was required.
• Three consultant anaesthetists were tasked with coordinating the care of evacuated patients and their visitors.
• Neighbouring hospitals were contacted, requesting vacant ICU beds into which we might transfer our patients.
• The next day' s elective surgical workload was assessed with a view to cancelling cases. 21.00: For several hours things moved quickly, and to manage the situation, I held a 15-minute incident review meeting every hour. These meetings kept the whole team overseeing the incident updated, and enabled focused instructions. Actions were recorded on a whiteboard, documenting everything done and the timeline. Everyone involved was calm and professional. Other hospitals and the fire and ambulance services were very supportive and all seemed to be working together on the same problem. Later, when the police arrived on site, that impression changed. for the well-being of the nurse who had been trapped by the burning bed. Increasingly, my focus widened from ensuring patient safety and a secure, functional hospital to include concerns for nursing and medical colleagues. The priorities of the attending police officers were different; we started discussions about how quickly we could clean and reopen at least part of ICU, but were informed that they considered the whole ICU to be a crime scene, requiring sealing and protection for evidence-gathering. A list of names, addresses and telephone numbers of all staff working on ICU at the time of the fire was requested. When I explained that the staff were so traumatised that it would be best to wait until the following morning, it was suggested that I was obstructing the police in their investigation, and led to an informal complaint about me to the Chief Executive.
23.45:
We were able to lift the ambulance diversion. We had informed a few elective surgical patients that their surgery was to be postponed. The staff involved were starting to go home. Following days: I took part in a number of debriefings, during which I remained thoroughly impressed by how disparate parts of our healthcare system come together to work so effectively in times of a crisis.
The consultant anaesthetist's perspective
The night: I was telephoned by a colleague within minutes of the fire and attended immediately. It took some time to establish roles, as many consultants were trying to help in several disparate areas of the hospital without knowledge of what was happening elsewhere. Mobile phones were invaluable. An early clinical decision was made that patients should continue to receive the same level of care that they had been receiving before the fire, that all should be actively assessed for evidence of inhalational injury and that treatment would be escalated for all patients if necessary that night. All patients were examined, and all had arterial blood gas analyses including carboxyhaemoglobin concentrations. None required escalation of treatment. Re-establishing the ICU: Following the fire, our patients were cared for in the theatre recovery area overnight. Estates staff worked through the night to make safe and clean the lessaffected half of the ICU, giving it three coats of paint overnight. Temporary drug and controlled drug cupboards were installed. At 11 am the following day, one half of ICU was re-opened to provide full ICU services. Existing patients were transferred from theatre recovery, and new patients admitted as necessary. The working part of the ICU was separated from the firedamaged part by a temporary plastic-sheet wall, behind which first the police and then the HSE carried out their investigations. This part of ICU was not 'returned to the hospital' until five days later. Estates staff and contractors then again worked continuously to enable re-opening of the entire ICU seven days after the fire.
There were several clinical challenges. The fire reduced the ICU below the size required for our hospital, but the rest of the hospital returned almost immediately to full capacity. The temporary ICU was very cramped, with inadequate storage space. All drug cupboards and their contents were destroyed in the fire, requiring emergency drug supplies. A desire to repatriate patients who had been transferred to other ICUs increased pressure on the unit. Until fully re-opened, the ICU was crowded and noisy, both internally and from major refurbishment work next door. The recent events and physical environment led to increased concern by patients and families, further increasing pressure and workload on ICU staff.
Many nursing and medical staff were off work for a period of time, increasing pressure on those at work. Many staff who were not working on the night of the fire were also upset and traumatised when they saw the state of the ICU, and realised how close the patients and their colleagues had been to losing their lives.
Daily briefings were established on the ICU, attended by senior executive and nursing managers, bed-managers, pharmacy managers and the senior ICU nurse and consultant. These were modelled on previous H1N1 influenza briefings that had been instigated during a period of escalation. These daily meetings were pivotal in engaging hospital management in understanding and resolving day-to-day problems.
The ICU outreach team, in addition to their usual role, provided emotional support to the families and patients who had been directly involved in the fire themselves.
Psychological aspect The ICU consultant's perspective
The majority of the staff working on the night of the fire suffered a severe trauma-stress reaction. All those involved agree that the presence of the clinical psychologist on the night of the fire to debrief staff and explain how they might feel was of enormous benefit. In my case, he spoke to me while I was a patient on the ED observation ward, and explained to me that I would experience an intense and severe reaction that would make me never want to go back onto the ICU again -and he was absolutely right.
Our psychologist also explained how to look after ourselves and each other. Many of us suffered nightmares and flashbacks immediately after the fire, and in many cases for months or even years afterwards; had I not been forewarned, I think I would have thought that I was going mad. Early expert psychological input was enormously beneficial for many of us, and I feel that major incident planning should include involving a psychologist or staff counsellor at an early stage.
The clinical psychologist's perspective
Following the incident, patients and relatives received psychological support but here I focus on support of the staff involved in the incident.
This incident on ICU did not relate directly to the mainstream literature on trauma-stress in the ICU setting. It was not about vicarious trauma for staff, or the patients' experience of critical illness and treatment. Both staff and patients were caught in a fire and were in immediate danger. The lives of patients and staff were at extreme risk, and they felt the heat of the fire, were blinded by the smoke and struggled to breathe. Coupled with this, they were only too aware that the fire threatened the rest of the hospital. This incident was an unambiguous critical incident.
The acute symptoms of trauma-stress include physiological hyper-arousal, flashbacks, avoidance of anything to do with the incident and a general numbing or flattening of all emotions. 2 These can quickly lead to fatigue and a range of secondary physical and behavioural difficulties, making us more prone to making errors, so this is a significant occupational issue in the health service. Fortunately, trauma-stress symptoms are manageable, most resolve, and the risk of developing full-blown post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is small. The acute trauma-stress reaction is a normal phenomenon. Understanding this makes it easier to manage, and reduces wasteful efforts trying to resist it, over-control it, conceal it or deny it. If staff can make sense of what they are going through and don't feel the need to be defensive about it, then a considerable number of problems can be averted. If not, then staff retention, morale, performance and efficiency are all jeopardised.
When I arrived at the hospital, all staff and patients were safe and I set about preparing the welfare response. Before leaving, staff were asked to gather in an area set aside for them to defuse, wind down and reflect on the incident before going home. As the hospital has trauma-stress awareness and management programmes in place, I didn't have to explain why I was there or what we needed to do. We had a therapeutic alliance from the start.
There was a palpable degree of psychological 'concussion,' and variations in how much people talked and what they focused on. Dazed, shocked and disbelieving were the main themes, and there was a collective concern to ensure that everyone was accounted for and cared for. In these circumstances, as a psychologist, simplicity is best while preparing the ground for the following few months. How much people remember of what you say at this point is debatable and probably minimal, but they remember how you relate to them and that is important for all follow-up contact and support. It felt very important to be present and composed, but not intrusive or pushy.
I worked with the senior ICU nursing staff to make sure no one was missed. I worry most about those who slip away or appear withdrawn, and here the senior staff' s knowledge of their team was vital. We told everyone what to expect over the coming days, and offered simple advice focusing on the first principles of self-care and well-being. No structured debriefing procedures were undertaken at this time as this would have been inappropriate.
The intensity of the incident led to several sustained and pronounced reactions in those involved. Acute trauma-stress in these circumstances is a very physical reaction, with blurring between what is physical feeling, emotion or thought. Those involved tend to feel fatigue and hyper-arousal simultaneously, feeling both 'wound-up and run down.' Each person' s experience of a critical incident is unique to them, and this can give rise to very different reactions. Exposure matters, and it was apparent that the longer staff were involved, the closer they were to the fire and the more smoke they inhaled, then the stronger the primitive, physical trauma reaction was. Senior staff were also more severely affected, possibly because they felt responsible for the welfare of their team.
In the next few days, it was necessary to support staff as they returned to work in a makeshift, temporary ICU, and support those who weren't involved and who kept the temporary ICU running. Some were unable to complete their first shift back at work, some were supernumerary for their first few shifts and undertook a graded return to full duties and for many the return to work was a very slow and difficult process. The nurse who was trapped by the flames was off work for a year.
Support was also required over the longer term. We all vary in how we respond to stress and trauma, firstly in our personal response to symptoms of trauma-stress and in our desire to ask for help, and secondly in the range of other experiences in our lives that can complicate things. Any staff welfare response needs to be flexible, to address this diversity and observe the right timescale. In our case, the hospital welfare team and Employee Assistance Programme remained active in support for many months after the event. Formal and organised services were put in place but, more importantly, the ICU team organised their own meetings and initiatives to help themselves recover from the event. Many of those involved are now working normally on the ICU, but will be forever changed by the experience.
Observations and lessons
Following this fire, the cylinder manufacturer (BOC Ltd, Guildford, UK) released recommendations on the use of oxygen cylinders, 1 endorsed by the Association of Anaesthetists
Summary points
• All healthcare workers should know how to deal with a fire in their place of work: they should know the location of fire call points, fire extinguishers, evacuation routes, and, in areas where patients cannot easily be evacuated, oxygen shut off valves
• Fire training should ideally take place 'in-situ,' that is in the actual area of work
• Consider attaching copies of the ward fire evacuation policy to the wall next to fire-call points, so that they can be removed in event of a fire and the instructions followed
• Oxygen cylinders should not be laid on a patient's bed or wheelchair if at all possible: instead use appropriately designed oxygen cylinder holders, fitted to the bottom of the bed or back of the wheelchair
• Set up the cylinder for patient use before placing it close to the patient, and turn on the oxygen cylinder before attaching the oxygen delivery device to the patient
• Major incident planning should involve calling a clinical psychologist or staff counsellor as early as possible, to help affected patients, families and staff Table 2 Recommendations regarding fire safety for healthcare workers.
Special article
of Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI). 3 The Safety in Anaesthesia Liaison Group (SALG) of the Royal College of Anaesthetists and AAGBI have produced a safety alert 4 regarding fire safety, which has been circulated to all healthcare workers in the UK. A summary of recommendations is included in Table 2 .
Fire training on our ICU has been improved, and now includes a 'fire tour' on induction, showing the location of fire call points, fire extinguishers and oxygen shut off valves, in addition to the standard Trust fire training. We have rewritten, and tested, our ICU fire evacuation policy, and have upgraded our switchboard fire control panel.
Discussions with the HSE are planned to discuss ICU design, sprinkler systems and fire retardant standards for mattresses, bedding, curtains, flooring and ceiling tiles. Current Department of Health guidance advises staff to leave a fire, close the door and await the fire and rescue services. 5, 6 Had such advice been followed in our case, the whole ICU and surgical block may well have been lost, resulting in numerous fatalities. While many hospitals have major incident policies, these may not be entirely suitable for an 'internal emergency,' where current patients and clinical staff are victims and the hospital fabric is damaged by the incident. Such emergencies pose particular challenges in management both of the immediate incident and also of the aftermath.
